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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
the subject case in some important respects. The principle case is unusual
in that the individual defendants never held title to the bank stock. This
distinguishes it from Corker v. SoperG where the shares were in the name
of the defendant as "agent" prior to their transfer to a subsequently formed
holding company.
The case falls squarely into a recognized gap in the statutory law.0 The
actual conflict is between the policies of encouraging business by affording
personal immunity to corporate shareholders and offering protection to the
creditors of national banks. That the court, when presented with the prob-
lem, felt it desirable to support the latter policy, is significant. The case
suggests an answer to the demand for more comprehensive legislation in
regard to holding company liability. For if the judicial process may prop-
erly go as far as in this case to effectuate and implement the policy of the
National Banking Act, it would seem preferable to permit gaps to be filled
by the more flexible, if somewhat less predictable, common law and prin-
ciples of equity.
While the court's opinion is rather vague as to the breadth of the doc-
trine enunciated, the conclusion seems to be that a holding company cannot
insulate its stockholders against assessment on national bank stock held by
it, when the holding company has no other assets. It should be noticed that
this proposition goes farther than is necessary for the decision of the case,
and, to that extent, must be regarded as dictum. All the court need have
decided here is that such insulation is impossible when the bank is, at the
time of the formation of the holding company, in an unstable condition and
is known to be so by the individuals forming the company. Therefore, it
seems likely that the principle will be narrowed somewhat, for it is hardly
applicable to the ordinary investment holding company which owns various
stocks and does not terminate its existence with the accomplishment of a
particular object. In considering this decision it should be kept in mind that
the bank shares constituted the holding company's only assets. It has been
felt that this is a special situation which justifies a rule declaring the hold-
ing company's shareholders personally liable.7
W. C. S., JR. '37.
BILLs AND NOTES-NEGOTIABILITY-BONDS OF MASSACHUSETTS TRUST
LIMITED TO TRUST FuNDs-At common law the efficacy of the attached seal,
and the incorporation of a specific fund for security, destroyed the nego-
tiability of corporate bonds. In both the United States and England cor-
porate bonds went through a long period of struggle for recognition as
negotiable instruments, though they are now fully recognized as being
5 Supra, note 2.6 i. e., the failure of the statutes to provide for the treatment of the double
liability feature in the event that national bank stock is held by one of the
various types of holding companies.
7 2 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 484, 1. c. 485.
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negotiable.' This view is declared to rest upon the faith that such bonds
are expressly designed to be thus circulated and to be sold in the stock
market like public securities and that they are universally so used.2 It was
this usage which gave to bills of exchange and promissory notes the quali-
ties of negotiability which were brought into our law through the Law of
Merchants and finally codified in the English Bills of Exchange Act and
our Negotiable Instruments Law. Contra to the English Bills of Exchange
Act the N. I. L. was so written, and has been so interpreted, as to include
corporate bonds within the operation of its provisions. 3 Under the N. I. L.
the law is well settled that the transfer of stolen commercial paper, nego-
tiable by delivery, to a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice and
before maturity, vests him with a good title against all the world,4 but if
the lost or stolen instrument is nonnegotiable the purchaser is not pro-
tected and the rightful owner is entitled to possession.5 Negotiability re-
quires conformity to certain provisions of the N. I. L., among which are
that it must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay,6 and that a
promise to pay limited to payment out of a particular fund is not uncon-
ditional.7
Thus in Lorimer v. McGreevy8 the debentures, being payable out of a
trust fund alone, were held nonnegotiable. The defendant stockholders,
through the New York Stock Exchange, handled the sale of two "Gold
1 Murray v. Lardner, (1864) 69 U. S. 110; Pratt v. Higginson (1918)
230 Mass. 256, 119 N. E. 661, 1 A. L. R. 714; Hibbs v. Brown, (1907) 190
N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108; White v. Vt. & Mass. R. (1858) 62 U. S. 575;
Hinckley v. Union P. R. (1880) 129 Mass. 52, 37 Am. Rep. 297; Barrett v.
Schuyler County Ct. (1869) 44 Mo. 197; Gorgier v. Miervlle (Exch. Chamb.
1824) 3 B. & C. 45.
2 Porter v. McCollum (1854) 15 Ga. 528; Natl. Exch. Bank v. Hartford,
P. & F. R. (1866) 8 R. I. 375, 91 Am. Dec. 237, 5 Am. Rep. 582; Morris
Canal & Banking Co. v. Lewis (1858) 12 N. J. Eq. 323, 329; White v. Vt. &
Mass. R., supra, note 1.
3 The English Bills of Exchange Act, by express provision, relates only
to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and checks. Edelstein v. Schuler &
Co. (1902) 2 K. B. 144. On the other hand, though there has been consider-
able criticism, it is now well settled in the United States that the N. I. L.
applies to bonds. Hibbs v. Brown, supra, note 1; King Cattle Co. v. Joseph,
(1924) 158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 436; Manhattan Co. v. Morgan (1926) 242
N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594; Grosfield v. First Natl. Bank of Miles City (1925)
73 Mont. 219, 236 Pac. 250.
4 O'Herron v. Gray, (1897) 168 Mass. 573, 47 N. E. 429, 40 L. R. A. 498;
Manhattan Savings Inst. v. N. Y. Exch. Bank (1902) 170 N. Y. 58, 62 N. E.
1079; Kuhns v. Gettysburg Nat. Bank (1871) 68 Pa. 445.
5 Dinsmore v. Duncan (1874) 57 N. Y. 573, 15 Am. Rep. 534; Young v.
Brewster (1895) 62 Mo. App. 628.
a N. I. L. see. 1, (2); R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 2630.
7 N. I. L. sec. 3; R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 2632. The test is: if the promise
or order carries the general credit of the maker or the drawer, it is abso-
lute; if, on the contrary, there is only the credit of a fund, the instrument
is not unconditional. Hibbs v. Brown, supra, note 1; Hutchinson First Nat.
Bank v. Lightner (1906) 74 Kan. 736, 743, 88 Pac. 59, 118 Am. St. Rep. 353,
8 LRA (N. S.) 231.
8 (June, 1935), 84 S. W. (2d) 667.
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Debentures" of the "International Hydro-Electric System," a voluntary
association created under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
under and by virtue of the declaration of a trust. Learning that they were
stolen bonds, under the Rules of the Exchange, the defendant repurchased
them from the holder in Boston. The plaintiff, as original owner, brought
replevin for their recovery. Among the provisions of the bonds was the
following: "no past, present or future trustee, shareholder, director, officer,
or agent of the Company shall be held to any personal liability for the
payment of the principal or of the premium or interest on this debenture."
To be negotiable, corporate bonds must carry the general credit of the
corporation9 and the court felt that this provision precluded this and made
the payment contingent. Holding that a business trust has no entity sepa-
rate from that of its trustees the court ruled that the bonds were payable
out of a specific fund, the trust, and hence nonnegotiable and recoverable
by the true owner.
The business rust, or as it is more commonly known, the Massachusetts
Trust, is a legal device by which it is sought to attain the benefits of
incorporation, particularly limited liability, without subjecting the business
to the numerous statutory regulations and taxes pertaining to corpora-
tions. 10 In determining liability it is often difficult to decide whether the
organization is to be considered as a common law trust or a partnership
or joint stock company: The vidw most universally adopted is that laid
down in the leading case of William v. Milton" holding the test to be the
amount of control reserved by the cestuis.12 If ultimate control is conferred
upon the trustees, the association will be considered as a common law trust.
The relationship between the cestuis and the trustees is not that of prin-
cipal and agent; rather the trustee is himself the principal.'3 Thus a prac-
9 Lorimer v. McGreevy, supra, note 8, 1. c. 677; note 7.
10 In the case of Hecht v. Malley (1924) 265 U. S. 144, 146, 44 S. Ct.
463, 68 L. Ed. 949, Mr. Justice Sanford defined such an organization as
follows: "The 'Massachusetts Trust' is a form of business organization
common in that State, consisting essentially of an arrangement whereby
property is conveyed to trustees, in accordance with the terms of an instru-
ment of trust, to be held and managed for the benefit of such persons as
may from time to time be the holders of transferable certificates issued by
the trustees showing the shares into which the beneficial interest in the
property is divided. These certificates, which resemble certificates for shares
of stock in a corporation and are issued and transferred in like manner,
entitle the holders to share ratably in the income of the property, and, upon
termination of the trust, in the proceeds."
11 (1913) 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355.
12 The test laid down seems to be: If by the declaration of trust the
shareholders reserve the actual or potential power, as a practical matter,
to control the trustees in conducting the business of the organization it is
a partnership. But, on the other hand, if the trustees are the principals
and not subject, as a practical matter, to the actual or potential control
of the shareholders, the organization is a pure trust and not a joint stock
company. Frost v. Thompson (1914) 218 Mass. 260, 106 N. E. 1009;
Neville v. Gifford (1922) 242 Mass. 124, 136 N. E. 160.
13 Taylor v. Davis (1884) 110 U. S. 330, 4 Sup. Ct. 147, 28 L. Ed. 163;
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tically unbroken line of authorities hold that the trustees are personally
liable on all contract and tort obligations incurred by them or their agents
in conducting the business of the trust.1 4 From this is derived the view
that the trust, as distinguished from the trustee, is not in itself a legal
entity. But despite this view it is possible for the trustees to escape per-
sonal liability by a specific contract provision limiting recovery against them
to the trust property. And both England and the United States support
the view that such a provision creates a charge upon the trust estate and
releases the trustee from his personal liability.15 It would seem to follow
that such cases have the tendency to make the trust itself, practically speak-
ing, a separate entity, for the trustees themselves are not bound and the
sole security is the trust. But the courts have not recognized the entity, as
a separate personality, of the trust.
Too it would seem that the N. I. L. intended to recognize the trust as a
legal entity. When the trustee designates himself sufficiently clear as such,
or indicates clearly the name of the principal, he exempts himself from
personal liability. 6 And the Act defines a person as "a body of persons,
whether incorporated or not," which seems reasonably broad enough to cover
business trusts and other similar associations."7 The weight of authority
holds that the trustee may thus exempt himself from personal liability but
they have failed to go further and recognize the trust itself as a separate
legal entity.
Such decisions certainly raise many practical difficulties. If bonds such
as these are to be allowed to circulate freely and to be listed upon the
various stock exchanges they should surely be such as would meet the
ordinary requirements of negotiability. If the courts continue to treat trust
bonds as nonnegotiable it would seem that they should not be allowed to be
McGovern v. Bennett (1906) 146 Mich. 558, 109 N. W. 1055; Connally v.
Lyons (1891) 82 Tex. 664, 18 S. W. 799.
14 Hewitt v. Phelps (1882) 105 U. S. 393, 26 L. Ed. 1072; Sanford v.
Howard (1857) 29 Ala. 684; New v. Nicoll (1878) 73 N. Y. 127; Johnson
v. Leman (1890) 131 11. 609, 23 N. E. 435, 7 L. R. A. 172; Odd Fellows
Assn. v. McAllister (1891) 153 Mass. 292, 26 N. E. 862, 11 L. R. A. 172.
15 Hussey v. Arnold (1904) 185 Mass. 202, 70 N. E. 87; McCarthy v.
Parker (1923) 243 Mass. 465, 138 N. E. 8; Rand v. Farquhar (1917) 226
Mass. 91, 115 N. E. 286; Hardee v. Adams Oil Co. (1923, Tex. C. App.),
254 S. W. 602. In Watling v. Lewis (1911) 1 Ch. 414, the court said that
if the trustee is not bound no one is bound, and hence it held that the
provision that the trustee could not be personally liable was repugnant and
void. But this was later reversed, In re Robinson's Settlement (1912)
1 Ch. 717, and England is now in accord with the U. S.
16 N. I. L. Section 20, R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 2649; Cotton v. Courtwright
(1926) 215 Ala. 474, 111 So. 7; First Nat. Bank of Pennsboro v. Delancey
(1930) 109 W. Va. 136, 153 S. E. 908; Gutelius v. Stanton (D. C. Mass.
1929) 39 F. (2d) 621; Hamilton v. Young et al. (1924) 116 Kans. 128,
225 Pac. 1045, 35 A. L. R. 496; Adams v. Swig (1919) 234 Mass. 584, 125
N. E. 857.
1, N. I. L. Section 191, R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 2822; In re Ziegenhein (Mo.
App. 1916) 187 S. W. 893; Shaw v. Smith (1889) 150 Mass. 166, 22 N. E.
887, 6 L. R. A. 348.
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listed upon the Exchanges as negotiable securities. If they are thus listed
any innocent purchaser is always taking the risk that the true owner will
some day reclaim them.
P. A. M. '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-
MoRATORIum LEGIsLATION.-In Home Building and Loan Association V.
Blaisdelli the Supreme Court held that a provision of the Minnesota Mort-
gage Act of 19332 for a two-year moratorium on mortgages was not an
impairment of the obligation of a contract under the contract clause of the
Constitution nor an infringement of the due process provision of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The law applied to mortgages existing at the effective
date of the law and provided that mortgagors, by judicial proceedings, might
secure a stay of foreclosures for a period not extending beyond May, 1935,
and varying according to the circumstances of each case. The act further
provided that in the proceedings which it authorized an order might be had
upon notice "determining the reasonable value of the income on said prop-
erty, or, if the property has no income, then the reasonable rental value of
the property...., and directing and requiring such mortgagor or judgment
debtor, to pay all or a reasonable part of such income, or rental value, in
or toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage, or judgment
indebtedness at such times and in such manner as shall be fixed and deter-
mined and ordered by the court." The act recited an emergency, occasioned
by the depression.
Since the Minnesota Mortgage case three decisions have clarified the
position of the Supreme Court on the general subject of retroactive legisla-
tion applied to debts. In W. B. Worthen Company v. ThomaS3 the Court
declared unconstitutional an Arkansas statute which exempted the benefit
payments on life, sickness, and accident insurance policies from legal process
for the satisfaction of any indebtedness existing at the time the act was
passed.4 Just before the law became effective the plaintiff company had
garnished a payment to a beneficiary by an insurance company, thus ac-
quiring a lien under the Arkansas law.6 The statute was upheld by the
State supreme court,6 but was reversed in the Supreme Court of the
United States on the ground that it impaired the obligation of contracts.
The Arkansas legislature, unlike that of Minnesota, made no attempt to
discriminate on the basis of need on the part of debtors or classes of debtors
1 (1934) 290 U. S. 398.
2Laws of Minnesota, 1933, p. 514.
3 (1934) 292 U. S. 426.
Laws of Arkansas, 1933, p. 321.
5 Desha v. Baker (1840) 3 Ark. 509, 520, 521; Martin v. Foreman (1856)
18 Ark. 249, 251; Smith v. Butler (1904) 72 Ark. 350, 351, 80 S. W. 580;
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Vanderberg (1909) 91 Ark. 252, 255,
120 S. W. 993; Foster v. Pollack Co. (1927) 173 Ark. 48, 51, 291 S. W.
989.
6 (1933) 65 S. W. (2d) 917.
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